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HIGHWA YS AND BI-WA YS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
RICHARD J. LAZARUS·

INTRODUCTION

The highway between Selma and Montgomery in Alabama
and the highway system surrounding the City of Atlanta in
neighboring Georgia are quite different in many obvious respects. The former is U.S. Route 80 that travels along a mostly
rural area of Alabama and is a mere 54 miles long. The latter
surrounds a major metropolitan area in neighboring Georgia
and consists of 1,016 miles of state roads and 218 miles of interstate highways, adding up to 5000 lane miles. 1 U.S. Route 80 is
most famous for an historic civil rights march that occurred
upon it in 1965, prompting Congress in 1996 to proclaim the
highway a "national historic trail." 2 The Atlanta highway system, in contrast, is best known as the site of the highest average
vehicular miles traveled (35 milesj day j person) of any place in
the world. 3 The Georgia Department of Transportation boasts
that 28 billion miles are driven each year in the Atlanta highway system, which is the equivalent of "58,000 round trips to
the moon! 4
Each of these highways is significant, albeit in very different ways, to environmental justice. Each illustrates the reasons
II

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This essay is based on a .
talk presented at the "Civil Rights in the New Decade" symposium held at Cumberland School of Law on February 15, 2001. I am grateful to the students at Cumberland
and the editors of the C/lInberland Law Review for inviting me to partici pa te in the
symposium. I would also like to thank Rachel Entman, Georgetown University Law
Center Class of 2001, for her excellent research in the preparation of both the talk and
this essay.
1
See State of Georgia Department of Transportation Website for District 7,
http://www.dot.state.ga.us/homeoffs/d7/dist7.htm (last visited March 24, 2001)
[hereinafter Georgia Transp. Dept. Website].
2
Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104333,110 Stat. 4093, § 501 (1996).
3
SprawlCities, http://www.islandpress.com!ecocompass/ community /sprawl.
html (last visited March 24, 2001).
• Georgia Transp. Dept. Website, supra note 1.
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why the environmental justice movement has risen to such national prominence during the past several decades. Both highways also provide an opportunity for more fully considering
the obstacles that the environmental justice movement faces in
its present effort to develop positive law consistent with the
transformation in norms that the movement has already
achieved. Finally, the two highways provide guidance on how
some of those present obstacles may well best be surmounted
in the future.
The purpose of this essay is to discuss the past, present,
and future of the environmental justice movement as illustrated by these two highways. The essay is divided into three
parts. The first part describes environmental justice, seeking
both to place it in a broader historical perspective and to discuss how it relates to civil rights law and environmental law.
The second part undertakes a closer examination of the challenges presented by efforts to fashion positive law to address
environmental justice norms. This discussion considers why it
has proven so difficult for both civil rights and environmental
law to evolve in a responsive fashion. Particular attention is
paid to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,5 which has been
an area of emphasis for many in the environmental justice
movement. Finally, the essay speculates on where progress is
more likely to be made in the future in terms of securing legal
bases for the promotion of environmental justice objectives.
The essay concludes that the two highways that bookend the
essay suggest possible bi-ways to environmental justice based
on both environmental and civil rights laws.
I. PLACING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE

Fifty four miles may not seem very far to travel by car. But
in March 1965, it was a very long walk. It was two weeks after
"Bloody Sunday" in Selma-the confrontation between Alabama State Troopers and civil rights protestors on Edmund
Pettus Bridge in Selma-when the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther
King led marchers on U.S. Route 80 from Selma to Montgomery. U.S. Route 80 is a "national historic trail" today because of
the historic role assigned to Reverend King's march in events
leading to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 later
5

42

usc. § 2000d-d(7) (1994).
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that same year. 6
Walking from Selma to Montgomery along U.S. Route 80
today, one passes by the small community of Lowndesboro in
Lowndes County. Just off the road is a 670 acre site for a proposed landfill. The landfill would receive 1,500 tons of solid
waste a day. Nearby the proposed site are signs declaring
"Don't Trash the Treasure! ," in loud protest to the landfill's
possible siting there?
The resulting visual imagery is extraordinary in its potential symbolic significance and in its meaning for environmental
justice. At the crossroads of u.s. Route 80 and the site of the
proposed landfill is a temporal and spatial joining of two of the
most successful movements for social change during the last
century: the civil rights and environmental movements.
Each of these movements resulted in the passage of an incredible number of far-reaching laws. Both sets of laws challenged settled business practices in Virtually every arena. But,
even more than that, they challenged individual behavior. They
questioned the morality of entrenched attitudes and made
unlawful what had previously been common practices. They
are, to that extent, subversive in their thrust. 8
Many, if not most, laws simply codify existing norms. They
reflect the current behavior of the vast majority. They are intended to denounce and rein in social outliers. The legal prescription is not itself controversial. It is those who break the
law that are controversial.
Both civil rights law and environmental law are alike in
that they reflect aspirational norms, not settled norms. They
reject the past and present. And they seek a better future. They
challenge current social, economic, and political forces that
sometimes consciously and more often subconsciously promote
means and ends in fundamental opposition to nondiscrimination and environmental protection objectives. As a result, both
kinds of law are unaVOidably controversial. They are tumultu6
See gellerally J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS,
1954-1965 252-85 (1987).
7
See Somini Sengupta, At Odds ill Alabama Over a Lalldfill 011 a Historic Trai/, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, A16:1; Critics Battle Lalldfill Plall Alollg Civil Rights ROllte, AUGUSTA
CHRON., July 10, 2000, A7. See gellerally Marlon Manuel, Landfill May Settle Alollgside
Histon}, ATLANTA J. & CaNST., July 23, 2000, A3.
8
For a discussion of the inherently "subversive" quality of environmental law,
see William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most Creative Momellts ill the History of Ellvirollmelltal
Law: The Who's, 39 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 1 (1999); see a/so Cass Sunstein, Civil Rights Legislatioll ill the 1990s: Thee Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 762 (1991) (" A principal purpose of civil rights law is to undo the historical wrong .... ").
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ous in their implementation. And they are subject to constant
attack and second guessing.
Environmental law also owes much in its own evolution to
civil rights law. The pathbreaking environmental lawyers of the
1960s and 1970s borrowed the successful strategies and tactics
of the civil rights lawyers that preceded them. They adopted
their models in the creation of public interest organizations,
their protests, their use of law reform litigation, and in their
lobbying of lawmakers. Not surprisingly, those who participated in civil rights protests, like the 1965 march from Selma to
Montgomery, include individuals who later became active in
the environmental movements during the 1960s and 1970s. 9
The image of a solid waste landfill alongside an historic
civil rights highway is also telling because it reminds us of the
potential overlap in goals of civil rights and environmental
laws. They are not simply parallel tracts related by their aspirational character. They also overlap substantively. There exists
within their respective spheres of concern much natural substantive harmony.
Civil rights is not just concerned with the right to vote,
public accommodations, employment, and education. Its reach
necessarily extends to environmental protection's core concerns: public health, quality of the air we breathe, the quality of
the water we drink, and the natural beauty of the world within
which we live. Indeed, the environmental movement in the
United States has been closely aligned to this historic preservation movement, which naturally extends to u.s. Route 80.
However, the image of the landfill adjacent to U.S. Route
80 simultaneously serves as a reminder of the potential complexity of the relationship between civil rights and environmental protection law. That relationship is not always so simple. Not always so direct. And not necessarily so harmonious.
The civil rights and environmental protection pathways
sometimes conflict. The first source of possible conflict derives
from environmental protection law's potential to cause the very
kinds of problems of discrimination that civil rights law seeks
to eliminate. The second source stems from the manner in
which the discrimination label masks nuances that blunt its
rhetorical force. The moral force behind an accusation of discrimination can itself be undermined if, over time, it is not
9
Richard J. Lazarus, Pursillg "Ellvirolllnelltaijustice": Ti,e Distributional Effeets of
Environmental Protfetioll, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 789 & n.l0 (1993).
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carefully focused. Environmental protection has proven to be a
difficult context for the necessary clear focus. 1o
As applied to the proposed landfill along U.s. Route 80, the
first type of conflict is evident from the landfill itself. The landfill is, of course, a product of environmental protection laws
and the physical location of such pollution treatment facilities
has been a primary focus of many in the environmental justice
movement. Environmentalists and government regulators long
assumed that environmental protection laws were progressive.
To the extent, therefore, that persons of color or low income
communities were disproportionately subject to pollution in
the first instance, environmental protection laws would corre.spondingly benefit those communities in a progressive manner.
Environmental protection laws would, accordingly, naturally
be part of the solution to redress the impacts of past discrimination and certainly not part of the problem. l1
What the proposed landfill in Lowndes County reminds us
is that environmental protection laws can also be part of the
problem. In a desire to make society as a whole better off in the
longer term, environmental protection laws may make some
isolated areas worse off at least in the near term. In Lowndes
County, by literally picking up everyone's garbage, much of
the State of Alabama is benefitted from the elimination of numerous, uncontrolled garbage dumps that historically existed
across the State. Yet, the upshot of these positive efforts towards environmental protection is nonetheless an aggregation
of residual environmental risks somewhere else, typically in
one location. No matter how well regulated that resulting facility, it is far from automatic that the community that houses that
facility and, hence, the associated aggregation of residual environmental risks, is better off. Indeed, that community may well
be worse off.
What environmental justice teaches is that, if left to default,
that single location is likely disproportionately to be a community of color or low-income community.12 That skewing may
result from racist attitudes, either surficial or subsurficial, conscious or subconscious, but it need not be. It can also be pro10
See Gerald Torres, Ellviromnental lustice: The Legal Mea/zillg of a Social Move·
me,zt, 15 J. L. & COM. 597, 603-05 (1996).
11
Lazarus, supra note 9, at 797-98 & n.38.
12
See generally Alice Kaswan, Elivironmental/llstice: Bridgi,zg the Gap Between Environmental Laws alld "/ustice," 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 273-78 (1997); Sheila Foster,
Race(ial) Matters: The QllestiolZ for E,zvirollmelltal Illstice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 729-30

(1993).
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duced by the so-called "normal" functioning of economic and
political forces built upon a framework of discriminatory attitudes and practices long since formally and widely condemned. These are the same forces that result in the distribution of other kinds of societal benefits and burdens. We are
constantly reminded how inequitable skewing of such benefits
and burdens occur in a host of areas, including many unanticipated. I3 There is no reason to assume environmental protection
is somehow immune from that same tendency.1 4
Environmental protection laws, therefore, may exacerbate
civil rights concerns rather than redress them. Substantial natural harmony exists between the civil rights and environmental
movements. But so too is there potential for substantial
dischordance.
The second source of possible conflict arises out of ambiguity in applying the race discrimination label in many environmental protection contexts. The proposed landfill in Lowndes
County here too is illustrative. At first, the controversy would
seem to possess many of the trappings of a classic problem of
environmental injustice. The proposed location would seem to
threaten, symbolically or otherwise, a highway of enormous
historical significance to the civil rights movement. The proposed landfill would also be in a county the population of
which is mostly African American15 and in a State that has frequently been the subject of complaints that its landfills have
historically been sited in African American communities. 16
The racial dimensions of the Lowndes County controversy,
however, can become more clouded upon further examination.
Supporters of the landfill stress that the closest town to the
proposed site, Lowndesboro, is mostly white, as is much of the
13
The most recent example dominating headlines has been so-called "racial profiling," suggesting that police officers in certain communities target racial minorities
for traffic stops in particular and criminal investigation in general. See, e.g., rver Peterson & David Halbfinger, New Jersey Agrees to Pay $13 Millioll ill Profilillg Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at A1:6.
H
For a thoughtful recent annotation of studies describing and analyzing the
disproportionate impact of environmental hazards by race and income, see gellerally
LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP-ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
AND THE RISE OFTHE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 167-83 (N.Y.U. Press 2001).
15
See Manuel, sllpra note 7, at A3.
16
See Letter Complaint submitted by Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment, California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, with Carol Browner, Administrator USEPA (December 17, 1999) (complaint details alleged Title V[ violations by Alabama Department of Environmental Management "by discriminating on the basis of
race in issuing and modifying permits to operate municipal solid waste landfills ...
.") (copy on file with author).
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opposition.17 A lawyer representing the landfill company further points out that the private school in that town where most
of the families send their children includes the Confederate
Flag as their symboI.18 He suggests that the landfill opponents
are therefore, perversely, using the "racism" label to further
their own personal objectives, when civil rights is not their aim
and actually something they otherwise oppose. 19 In further
support, landfill supporters stress that the County Board that
has approved the landfill is comprised of a majority of black
members and that the Chairman of the Board is himself black. 2o
The supporters also include at least some members of the African American community who argue that the landfill will be
beneficial because it will provide economic revenue. and other
benefits to the county.21
The purpose of this essay is not to purport. to determine
whether, in fact, the landfill supporters are correct. in their responsive characterization of the racial dimensions of the
Lowndes landfill controversy. It is instead to raise the issue
because such ambiguities are not unique to this landfill and
they underscore the difficulties often created when the race
discrimination label is invoked in the environmental context.
The decisionmaking process surrounding a landfill siting determination is invariably quite complex, involving many multiple parties both public and private. It is for that reason inherently difficult to assign cause and effect and to assign a single
motive for anyone actor's behavior. Because there are invariably going to be a multiplicity of motivations at play, it may
quickly become "relatively fruitless [to] search for a wrongdoer, or in other words, the bad person with evil intent."22
There is also a tendency among those naturally sensitive to accusations of racism to believe, mistakenly, that the accusation
necessarily lacks merit so long as there are at least some individuals of the minority race who support their position on the
underlying controversy. As I have suggested elsewhere,23 such
Sengupta, supra note 7, at A16:1.
Ellis BrazaellII, Walston, WelIs, Anderson & Bains, Remarks at the "Civil
Rights in the New Decade" symposium held at the Cumberland School of Law of
Samford University (Feb. 15, 2001).
17

See

18

C.

19

Id.

Sengupta, supra note 7, at A16:1; Manuel, supra note 7, at A3.
21
Sengupta, supra note 7, at A16:1.
22
Torres, supra note 10, at 602.
23
See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, "Ellvirollmental Racism! That's Wilat It 15",2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. 255, 272-73.
20
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a split within a community may instead suggest the early, yet
incomplete successes of efforts to attain racial justice rather
than the lack of any racial problem at all. No community or
race need speak with one voice to have a voice.
As suggested by the underlying complexities of the racial
dimensions of the Lowndes County landfill controversy, the
historical relationship between the civil rights' and environmental movements is not at all simple. It is quite nuanced. And
it is marked by converging and diverging pathways.
The popular image of the relationship between the two
movements has the advantage of simplicity, but the disadvantage of historical inaccuracy. The popular image portrays two
movements parallel until the late 1980s and early 1990s when
the environmental justice movement emerged nationally. The
environmental justice movement however, has much earlier
roots. It can be easily traced to the sanitation and public health
movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
These movements responded to serious public health problems,
especially in urban areas, \aused by open sewers, uncontrolled
garbage disposal on the streets, absence of distinct residential
and industrial zoning classifications, and the unregulated processing and manufacturing of food. The cities suffered, accordingly, from extraordinary density, disease, and epidemics. 24
The sanitation and public health movements responded by
promoting programs of municipal sewage systems, street
cleaning, and garbage collection. Cities promulgated zoning
laws, smoke abatement codes, and noise ordinances. Thenemerging statutory schemes, such as the food, drug, and meat
inspections' statutes passed by Congress in 1906 are clear precursors of modern environmental law. To the extent that these
laws addressed the problems of the urban poor, they are likewise clearly precursors to the kinds of laws being promoted by
the environmental justice movement today.25 The extent to
which, however, the benefits of those laws were distributed in
an equitable and nondiscriminatory fashion is far less clear.
An early twentieth century exainple of the potential injus2.
See generally ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING -- THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 7-8, 55-69 (1993); RICHARD N.L.
ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES -- A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 126-29 (1993); Robert J. Brulle, Ellvirollmflltal

Discourse and Social Movement Organizations: A Historical and Rhetorical Perspective Oil
the Development of u.s. Environmental Orgallizatiolls, 66 Soc. INQUIRY No.1, 58, 70 (Feb.
1996).
25

ANDREWS,

Sllpra

note 24, at 109-35.
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tice in both the infliction of harm and the crafting of legal redress is supplied by the tragic events surrounding Union Carbide's construction during the 1930s of a tunnel at Gauley
Bridge in West Virginia. Union Carbide sought to construct the
tunnel as part of a larger plan to build a dam, hydroelectric
facility, and tunnel near the town of Hawk's Nest. Union Carbide reportedly was aware at the outset of the serious public
health hazards to workers associated with the construction project. The earth in the area to be excavated contained an exceedingly high percentage of silica (ninety percent or more) and the
. silica dust released by the construction would become absorbed in the workers lungs, leading to a variety of serious
health problems, ranging from silicosis, pneumonia, and tuberculosis. Union Carbide sought out migratory workers for the
project, mostly African Americans from Georgia, Alabama,
Florida, and the Carolinas. The African American workers
worked in the areas of the mine where the exposure was
thought to be the highest. At least 581 of the 922 African
American workers died. Because the hazards were greater than
anticipated in areas thought to be less hazardous, 183 of the 291
white workers also died. 26
Union Carbide paid relatively little in liability to those who
were injured and died. The bodies of mostly African American
workers were disposed of in a nearby field that, subsequently
planted over, made it virtually impossible then to identify the
workers and determine the cause of death. Union Carbide ultimately settled with 157 plaintiffs, agreeing to pay them
$157,000. At least half that sum was paid, however, to the
plaintiffs' attorneys. In addition, the terms of the settlement for
allocating the money were on strict racial lines. An unmarried
African American received $400 and a married African American received $600; an unmarried white man received $800 and
a married white man received $1000; and $1600 was allocated
to each family of deceased white men. 27
The racial divisions revealed in the Union Carbide Settlement at Gauley Bridge are especially stark but not an isolated
phenomenon. Charges of elitism have long been directed at the
conservation movement, and with some justification. National
26

GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 236-39; see Grover Hankins, "Visiting ti,e [niqllity

(SillS) of the Fathers UpOIl the Childrell"; Fashiollillg a Natiollal Template of Affirmative

Relief for Workers of Color Preselltly SlIfferillg the Chemical Effects of Past Discrimillatioll, 2
1. REV. 161, 167-68 (2000).
27
GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 239; Hankins, supra note 26, at 167-68.

RUTGERS RACE &
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parks were, by design, made less accessible to the poor. 28 When
famed New Yorker Robert Moses opened up the Long Island
beaches to the public, he also made sure that the poor and minorities of the City would be less able to reach those same
"public" beaches, by building bridges over the roads too low
for public transit buses to pass under. 29
Charges of environmental elitism continued throughout
the modern environmental era. Racial minorities frequently
complained that wealthy white neighborhoods invoked environmental concerns as a pretense in support of exclusionary
zoning practices designed to prevent racial segregation. 30 In
1970, the Mayor of Gary, Indiana, Richard Hatcher, responded
to the successes of the environmental movement by stressing
that movement's adverse impact on the cause of civil rights.
Mayor Hatcher contended that "the nation's concern with the
environment has done what George Wallace has been unable to
do: distract the nation from the human problems of black and
brown Americans."31 During the 1972 Stockholm Conference
on the Environment, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
drew the connection differently, while emphasizing her own
nation's priority. Gandhi declared that poverty is the worst
kind of pollution. 32
In certain respects, the divide deepened during the 1970s.
A 1971 poll of members of the Sierra Club disclosed that fortyone percent of that organization's members strongly disagreed
with the proposition that the Sierra Club should pay special
heed to the pollution problems of the poor; only fifteen percent
of those polled strongly agreed with the statement. 33 The Sierra
See GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 31-32.
Marc Poirier, Ellvirollmelltal justice alld tlze Beach Access Movemellts of the 1970s
ill COllllecticut and New jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719,
744 n.63 (1996).
30
See Joel Kosman, Toward A'I lllclllsiollary jurisprudellce: A Recmlceptualizatioll of
ZOllillg, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 60 (1993); see also Yale Rabin, Expulsive ZOllillg: The
[llequitable Legacy of Euclid, ill ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101 (Charles M.
Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1990) (discussing practice of "expulsive zoning" in
minority neighborhoods by allowing for nonresidential uses in those neighborhoods).
31
Leonard G. Rilt & John M. Ostheimer, COllgressio'lal Voting alld Ecological [ssues, 3 ENVTL. AFF. 459, 465 & n.18 (1974) (quoting The Rise of Allti-Ecology?, TIME, Aug.
3, 1970, at 42).
32
Karen Mickelson, RI,etoric alld Rage: Third World Voices ill illtematiollal Legal
Discourse, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J. 353, 389 (1998) (,"The rich countries may look upon development as the cause of environmental destruction, but to us it is one of the primary
means of improving the environment of living, of providing food, water, sanitation
and shelter, of making the deserts green and the mountains habitable."') (quoting
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi).
33
GOTILIEB, slIpra note 24, at 253-54.
28

29
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Club was also pursuing at this time population control and
anti-immigration policies that many in the civil rights community considered racist in origin and effect. 34
By the late 19805, environmentalism seemed to exist on virtually two tracks. 35 There was, on the one hand, the national,
so-called "mainstream" environmental public interest organizations such as the Sierra Club, National Wildlife Federation,
World Wildlife Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council, and
Environmental Defense Fund. These organizations were highly
sophisticated, effective, and relatively well-funded. Their professional staff included teams of scientists, economists, and
lawyers trained at many of the nation's most prestigious academic institutions, who lobbied and litigated on behalf of environmental protection goals. 36
The other, increasingly distinct track was that being developed by the rising grassroots environmental movement. This
movement was marked by community based neighborhood
associations rather than national organizations. Many of its
leaders were themselves members of low-income communities
and racial minorities. They lacked the formal training of the
professional staff in the national groups, but possessed instead
an expertise based on personal experience and passion. These
grassroots organizations were often led by women. 37
The inevitable collision between the two tracks occurred in
the late 1980s and early 1990s with the grassroots organizations' formally challenging the legitimacy and continuing relevancy of the national groups.38 They demanded that the national groups pay attention to the concerns of the poor and to
the complaints of racial minorities. They demanded that the
national groups shift their priorities and reallocate their resources on behalf of environmental justice concerns. And they
rejected any efforts to create a national environmental justice
organization to speak on their behalf, opting instead for a more
decentralized framework that retained the voices of the indi-

Id. at 256-59.
Seth Zuckerman, Ellvirollmentalism TlIms 16, THE NATION, Oct. 18, 1986, at
368-69; GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 170.
36 GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 117-61; Robert Percival, The Political Origills of Modem Ellvirollmelltal Law: Ellvirollmwtal Legislatioll alld the Problem of Collective Actioll, 9
14

35

DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL. F. 9, 13, 15-20 (1998).
37
GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 162-204, 207-34; Marc R. Poirier, Ellvirolllllelltal/lIs-

ticejRacismjEqllity: Call We Talk?, 96 W. VA. L. REV.
38
GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 260.

1083,1095 (1994).
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vidual communities themselves. 39
The impact on the environmental and civil rights movements during the past decade has been considerable. Virtually
all of the national environmental organizations have environmental justice programs. 40 They also now perceive their agenda
differently as a result of the environmental justice movement.
The national groups are more apt to discern the environmental
justice dimension of a controversy that before they would have
dismissed as outside their ambit of concern. These groups are
more likely to forge working relationships with affected community organizations. There has been a change in culture. 41
Like many such cultural shifts, it is far from complete or
satisfactory to those affected. There are basic cultural differences, both personal and professional. Differences in priorities
are inevitable. And, early successes are just as likely to intensify rather than reduce those differences. Whether the settlement of a lawsuit or passage of a new law, the law and policymaking processes depends on the interested parties making
hard choices between competing priorities.
There are some who argue that vagueness in goals and underlying conflicts in priorities will severely limit the ultimate
effectiveness of the environmental justice movement. 42 My own
view is that much has already been accomplished by the union
of the civil rights and environmental movement and it is too
speculative to say what the full potential of the union is for
positive reform. The efforts to realize that potential are underway right now in communities throughout the nation, including the Lowndes County landfill controversy. Opponents of the
landfill are relying on environmental laws to prevent the siting.
Opponents of this landfill and others in the State of Alabama
are also relying on civil rights remedies. Their lawyers now
include those employed by organizations, such as the Center
for Race, Poverty, and Environment, that are specifically concerned with addressing the environmental justice concerns of
39
The rejection of a national organization was something the author witnessed
while attending the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Conference in Washington, D.C., held in Washington, D.C. in October 1991.
.0
The websites of these organizations all stress these programs. See, e.g., Sierra
Club, http://www.sierraclub.org/ foundation/ programs/ environmental.asp; Environmental Defense, http://www.edf.org/programs/EJ.
'1
Kaswan, supra note 12, at 264-65.
<2
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER FOREMAN, THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE (1998); Poirier, supra note 37, at 1099 ("Isn't this movement impossibly
vague?") (quoting Dr. Michael Greve, Remarks at the St. John's Law School Environmental Justice Symposium (Apr. 8, 1994)).
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communities. 43
II. LAWMAKING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

During the past decade, a consensus has generally
emerged that the environmental justice movement identifies
real and substantial problems. Inequities exist based on race
and income. These inequities relate to the burdens imposed by
pollution in the first instance. And, even more unsettlingly,
they may be exacerbated by governmental pollution control
efforts. The siting of facilities is part of the problem, but not the
exclusive source. The problems identified by environmental
justice extend to the setting of environmental protection standards in the first instance, their implementation through permit
requirements and conditions, and their administrative and judicial enforcement. 44 Environmental justice also concerns,
throughout these legal contexts, the need for those in the community affected by the decisions to be provided a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to participate in the
decisionmaking process is independently valuable. 45
The dramatic increase in public awareness and, in many
quarters, the acceptance of the teachings of the environment~l
justice movement stand in sharp contrast to clear changes in
positive law. There have been very few. 46 This is partly because
of controversy concerning the cause of the problems identified
by the environmental justice movement. While many are persuaded that race and racial discrimination is a major cause,47
others insist that more "neutral" market and political forces are
the cause. 48
.
The controversies surrounding causation, however, are
only part of the reason for the lack of formal changes in positive law. During the early 1990s, there was sound reason to believe that such changes were about to be made through federal
See supra note 16.
Lazarus, supra note 23, at 265-68.
4S
See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the
Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998); Kaswan, S/lpra note 12, at 232-39.
46
Those that have occurred have been primarily in state law. See Valerie P. Mahoney, Ellvirolllnelital Justice: From Partial Victories to Complete SO/utiOIlS, 21 CARDOZO
L. REV. 361, 376-378 (1999); Recent Developments, A Survey of Ellvirollmeutal Illstice
Legislatioll ill tile States, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1459 (1995).
47
See, e.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990); Foster, supra note 12, at 731-38.
48
See, e.g., Lynn Blais, Ellvirollmental Racism Recolisidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75
(1996).
43

..
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legislation. Federal lawmakers were then debating several proposals for "environmental justice" legislation. 49 The newlyelected Vice President, Al Gore, had been a co-sponsor of one
of those proposals. SO Members of the Democratic Party, which
controlled both congressional chambers, included representatives who voiced support for the legislation's enactment. And,
Benjamin Chavis, the newly-appointed head of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, was especially well known for his work on environmental justice issues. S1
To a large extent, political events far broader than the environmental justice movement simply overwhelmed any possibility of securing federal legislation. With the congressional elections in 1994, the Republican Party became the majority party
in both chambers, for the first time in decades. The resulting
"divided government" led to a virtual standstill in new environmental legislation during the rest of the decade_ Environmental law had, before the 1990s, been famous for its extraordinary dynamism. 52 The law was constantly changing. Since
the beginning of the modern environmental era in the early
1970s, Congress had consistently revisited and revised in significant respects the federal environmental protection programs. But since 1990, Congress has failed to amend any of the
major pollution control laws. It became virtually impossible to
achieve the legislative compromises necessary for significant
changes in environmental law. The proffered environmental
justice legislation was a casualty of that congressional stalemate.
The challenge during most of the 1990s has, accordingly,
been to forge redress for claims of environmental justice primarily from existing law. Not surprisingly, these efforts have
addressed the problem from two distinct angles. There have
been efforts to try to apply existing civil rights law to the environmental context. There have also been attempts to apply ex.9 See Craig Anthony Arnold, Plallllilig Milagros: Ellvirollmental Jllstice alld Lalld
Use Regulatioll, 76 DENV. U. REV. 1,45-46 (1998).
50
See 138 CONGo REC. 57480-02, 7489 (1992) (statement of Sen. Albert Gore, Jr. introducing the Environmental Justice Act, 5.2806, 102d Congo (1st Sess. 1992)); Linda
D. Blank, Seekillg Solutiolls to Eliviroliltlelital lliequity: The Elivirollmelltal/ustice Act, 24
ENVTL. L. 1109, 1116-1128 (1994).
51
See Lazarus, supra note 9, at 857 n.324.
52
See A. Dan Tarlock, The NO/lequilibriultl Paradigm ill Ecology alld the Partial U/lravelillg of Ellviroliltlelltal Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1121 (1994); Daniel A. Farber, EnvirOllmelltal Protectioll as a Leamillg Experiellce, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 791 (1994).
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isting environmental protection laws to the civil rights context.
Neither has proved to be a nice or easy fit. The civil rights
law model seemed better designed for the fair, nondiscriminatory allocation of benefits, rather than the burdens of governmental regulation. The environmental protection model turned
out to be not especially well designed for consideration of economic or socioeconomic concerns, or for an accounting to the
subjective factors motivating particular decisionmakers.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is illustrative of both
the potential reach and limitations of civil rights law in the environmental. context. Title VI imposes a nondiscrimination
mandate on recipients of federal financial assistance: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."53
Title VI is relevant to environmental protection generally
and environmental justice, in particular, because of the sheer
number of activities affecting the quality of the human environment that receive some form of federal financial assistance.
The federal government spends considerable sums on those
that pollute and on those that regulate pollution, including
state and local governments. All are potentially subject to Title
VI's nondiscrimination mandate. 54
.
Title VI is especially significant to environmental justice
because existing judicial precedent supports the authority of a
federal agency's promulgating regulations extending Title VI's
nondiscrimination mandate to activities or programs with a
discriminatory or disparate impact.55 Proof of a violation, accordingly, does not require a showing of discriminatory intent .
.Such subjective motivation is always hard to prove, but has
been an especially high hurdle in the environmental context
given the sheer number of actors and possible motivations for
relevant decisions. Indeed, every environmental justice plaintiff
who has sought to prove an equal protection violation, which
requires just such a showing of discriminatory intent, has
failed. 56 Most federal agencies, including EPA, have Title VI
5l

42 U.s.c. § 2000d (1994).
See gmerally James H. Colopy,

Tire Road Less Traveled: Pursllillg Elwirollmelltal
jllstice Throllgh Title VI OJ the Civil Rights Act oJ 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 125 (1994).
55
See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of the City of New York,
5'

463 U.s. 582 (1983).
56
See, e.g., KISE., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd 977
F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); Bean v. Southwest Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 674 (S.D.
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regulations that extend to a prohibition on disparate impact. 57
Another particularly attractive aspect of Title VI for environmental justice plaintiffs is current judicial precedent supporting the availability of a private right of action to enforce
Title VI regulations. 58 Theoretically, therefore, the environmental justice organization is not wholly dependent for enforcement of Title VI on the willingness of the federal agency
that has funded the activity that allegedly results in the forbidden disparate impact. The aggrieved individuals or community
representatives may initiate their own enforcement action
based on Title VI regulations against the recipient of federal
aid.
The Clinton Administration early on indicated a willingness to develop an effective environmental justice program
based on Title VI. The President issued an executive order on
environmental justice in February 1994 that referred repeatedly
to Title VI and instructed agencies to develop strategies to
identify and address disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects [of its programs, policies, activities] on minority populations and low-income populations."59 Pursuant to that executive order, EPA took the lead
in the order's implementation both convening an interagency
Federal Working Group on Environmental Justice and developing EPA's own environmental justice strategy. 60
At least within EPA, the impact of this planning process
has been the proliferation within the Agency of a series of decentralized changes in planning and decision making processes
involving standard setting, public participation and enforcement. 61 The Agency has also sought to implement Title VI by
developing comprehensive guidance regarding the investigations of allegations that an EPA-funded program or activity is
resulting in a disparate impact in violation of Title VI.62 As of
1/

Tex.

1979).

See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35 (1999).
See il/fra'note 64 and accompanying text.
59
Exec. Order No, 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg, 7629 (February 11, 1994),
hO
[d, § 1-102. The work of EPA's National Environmental Justice Advisory
Committee, on which the author served for several years, reflects the extent of EPA's
commitment to developing a meaningful environmental justice strategy for the
Agency. See, e.g., U.S. EI/virollmelltal Protectioll Agellcy Office Of Ell vi rOllin ell tal Justice In
tile Matter of the Fifth Meetillg of the National Envirolllnelltal JlIstice Advisory COllncil, 9
57
58

ADMIN.

L.J. 623 (1995).

Lazarus, SIlpra note 23, at 265-69.
62
See Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering Environmental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft Revised
61
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this past November, EPA had received more than 100 Title VI
administrative complaints,63 and there have been several private Title VI actions filed in court. 64 Many of these actions are
directed against state and local governments. Some challenge
permitting decisions; others challenge broader policy initiatives.
Notwithstanding good faith agency intention, the task of
implementing Title VI has proven far more difficult than either
EPA officials or environmental justice community representatives likely anticipated in the first instance. While EPA has
dismissed a substantial number of the administrative complaints on procedural grounds (e.g., the alleged violator was
not a recipient of EPA financial assistance),65 the Agency has
decided only one case on the merits, which it dismissed. 66 The
reason is simultaneously simple and complex. It turns out to be
exceedingly difficult to develop criteria for the assessment of
disparate impact violations and remedies in the environmental
regulatory context.
The root problem in undertaking a disparate inquiry in the
environmental regulatory context appears to be causation in
the first instance and redressability in the second. The causation problem derives from the multiplicity of both public and
private decision makers connected to the amount of pollution
occurring in anyone area or areas. It is far from obvious how
one should decide the relevant universe of either the regulator
or the regulated in deciding whether a disparate impact has
occurred. The redressability problem stems from the difficult
policy issues presented in deciding whether there are mitigating actions that the recipient may take to make acceptable what
is otherwise unacceptable and, alternatively, whether there are
circumstances when a disparate impact may be justified under
Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits
(Draft Revised Investigation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650-39,701 ijune 27, 2000).
63
An up-to-date listing of Title VI complaints filed with EPA can be found at the
website of EPA's Office of Environmental Justice. See http://www.epa.gov
/ ocrpagelj docs/t6~snov2000.pdf (last.visited March 24, 2001).
M
See, e.g., New York City Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65 (2d Cir.
2000); Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556 (11th Cir. 1996).
65
See Bradford Mank, Tile Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidallces: Too Muell Discretioll for EPA and a More DiffiCll1t Standard for Complaillts?, 30
ENVTL. L. RPTR. 11,144, 11,147 (Dec. 2000).
66
See_Letter from Ann E. Goode, Director of EPA's Office of Civil Rights to Father Phil Schmitter and Sister Joanne Chiaverini, Co-Directors, st. Francis Prayer
Center, and Russell Harding, Director, Mich. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, regarding the
Select Steel Complaint (Oct. 30, 1998) (on file with author); see Luke W. Cole, Wrollg 011
the Facts, Wrollg 011 the Law, 29 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10,775 (Dec. 1999).
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Title VI.
EP A has, to date, only begun to answer these Title VI causation and redressability issues in a single context: permitting. 67 It has identified but not yet considered other contexts
such as the Agency's setting of environmental standards and
enforcement policies.68 Permitting, however, has hardly proven
to be an easy terrain for a first step, but a stumbling ground
instead.
A straightforward example is illustrative. In Alabama, the
Center for Race, Poverty, and the Environment has filed an
administrative complaint with EPA alleging that the State's
permitting of landfill facilities has resulted in a disparate impact unlawful under the federal agency's Title VI regulations. 69
In processing that complaint on the merits, EPA has to address
at a minimum three questions:
(1) Whether there is a disparate impact;
(2) Whether the disparate impact is proscribed by the
Agency's Title VI regulations;
(3) Whether an otherwise unlawful disparate impact
may, through mitigating measures, be rendered permissible.
Each of these inquiries eludes an obvious response.70 The first
itself breaks down into at least four further inquiries:
(1) What kind of impacts are relevant to the disparate
impact inquiry?
(2) What are the relevant sources of those impacts?
(3) What is the baseline in comparison for determining
whether a disparity exists?
(4) What degrees in difference constitute a "disparity"
for disparate impact purposes?
The ambiguities associated with causation complicate these
inquiries.
The "impact" inquiry has several possible scopes, with
vastly different policy implications. The narrowest approach
would be to take into account only proven adverse human
health impacts. This would place outside the scope of relevant
67

68
69

65 Fed. Reg. 39,650-39,651 Oune 27, 2000).

See id.
See supra note 16.

70
For a general discussion of the associated difficulties, see National Advisory
Council for Environmental Policy and Technology, Report of the Title VI Implementation Advisory Committee, Next Steps for EPA, State, and Local Environmental lustice
Programs (March 1, 1999). The author served as a member of the EPA's Title VI Implementation Advisory Committee.
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impacts unrealized environmental risks, even though the environmental statutes are, by their nature, primarily focused on
risks rather· than impacts. Embedded within this threshold issue, accordingly, is the fundamental question concerning the
extent to which the government should pursue a precautionary
approach that guards against risk qua risk rather than certain,
demonstrated adverse human health effects.
The full spectrum of possible approaches is further suggested by considering the broadest possible approach to the
impact inquiry. The broadest approach would be to take into
account all of the impacts proximately caused by the facility to
be permitted, regardless of whether those impacts are those
within the authority of the relevant permit authority to consider. For instance, when state authorities were considering
granting a permit for the locating of a solid waste facility in
Chester, Pennsylvania, one of the primary impacts ofthat facility was going to be the exceedingly high number of trucks using residential streets to travel to the facility.71 The sheer number of trucks threatened to devastate the community, with
noise and air pollution and by their physical disruption of the
streets. Such an impact is only indirectly related to the hazards
regulated by an agency charged with ensuring against risks
generated by the solid wastes themselves.
A related issue is whether an impact can be deemed sufficiently "adverse" for the purpose of disparate impact analysis
if the facility is in compliance with all applicable environmental
permitting requirements. The more relaxed approach here
would be to allow for such a defense, based on the theory that
statutory requirements are intended to guard against unreasonably adverse risks; compliance therefore can fairly be
equated with the absence of such effects. The opposing argument is that the statutes provide no such guarantee. Not all
environmental requirements are health-based; many are instead based on technolOgical or economic feaSibility and fail,
moreover, to take into account the possible aggregation of multiple sources of pollution. Such requirements do not, accordingly, provide a guarantee that permitted effects will not be
adverse, let alone distributed without disparate effect. Were
statutory compliance a defense, Title VI would arguably be
meaningless, because it would add nothing to what is already
71
Sheila Foster, !lIstice from the Grollnd Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transfonnative Politics of tIle EnviTOlllnental Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L.

REV. 775,780 (1998).
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required by the environmental statutes.
Determining the relevant sources for the disparate impact
inquiry likewise raises a host of controversial matters. In the
unlikely event that there is only one relevant source of whatever impact is allegedly disparate, the natural question is
whether there can ever be a disparate impact based on one single facility. The likelihood of that occurring naturally turns on
how broadly or narrowly one defines the denominator for purposes of the disparate impact analysis. If a generic unit of environmental risk serves as the baseline, the single source phenomenon is unlikely to occur. The more precisely, however,
one defines the particular risk involved, the greater the likelihood that every site will be seen as distinct and therefore the
less likely a finding of disparate impact.
A closely related question arises in the more likely scenario
where there are multiple sources of the relevant impact. The
question concerns how one defines the universe of sources in
deciding whether a disparate impact exists. In this context, the
more relaxed approach would be to consider only sources of
the impact regulated by the specific permitting agency, the decisions of which are being challenged under Title VI. Under
that view, the permitting agency would be responsible only for
its own decisions and not for disparate impacts for which it
may have been a contributing, but not independent cause. The
sources that would fall outside the scope of the determination
whether a disparate impact exists would be sources regulated
by other permitting agencies (for instance, those located in
other jurisdictions) and, perhaps even more significantly, unregulated sources. For many types of pollutants, there are exemptions that, in aggregation, may add up to substantial
amounts of pollution.
A far more demanding approach under Title VI would be
to make the disparate impact inquiry without being limited to
just those sources regulated by the specific permitting agency
subject to the Title VI claim. The disparate impact determination would, accordingly, be made separate from a determination of the extent to which the permitting agency should be
deemed legally responsible for the disparity. Such an approach
could allow for a remedy proportionate to the permitting
agency's contribution to the problem. Alternatively, under a
theory of responsibility more analogous to joint and several
liability, a more demanding approach might even support
holding the permitting agency more broadly responsible for
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guarding against the resulting disparity in environmental impact. At this endpoint of possible approaches, it could even be
made a per se violation of Title VI disparate impact regulations
to allow "any additional environmental impact to a community
already subject to a disparate impact.
A related, difficult issue concerns the proper treatment of
an application for a permit renewal where, as might happen,
there is reason to suspect that a disparate impact now exists
that did not exist at the time of the original permit issuance
years ago. The more lenient option would be to exempt the facility seeking a permit renewal from any scrutiny under Title
VI regulations. The justification for such leniency would be that
the facility is seeking merely to continue ongoing operations.
So long as the facility is not increasing its emissions, it should
not be considered legally responsible for any existing disparity
in impact. The directly opposing view would be that the initial
permit was, by its own terms, of limited duration and that a
permit renewal application should be treated no differently
than a new application. There should be no grand-fathering of
existing disparities. Under that view, to the extent that the facility seeking a permit renewal has, based on existing investment-backed expectations, more compelling equitable circumstances than a truly new proposed facility, those kind of policy
concerns should play a role in the allocation of responsibility
between new and existing sources. They do not support an absolute defense to any legal responsibility.
The same point/ cQunterpoint debates similarly emerge in
answering the other questions posed by the disparate impact
inquiry. In determining the relevant baseline for purposes of
the necessary comparison, one has to select certain spatial and
temporal dimensions. Their selection may dramatically affect
the conclusion. The same may be said for deciding how big the
difference must be for it to be "disparate." Any difference? A
significant difference? A statistically significant difference
based on standards of deviation analysis? There is likely to be
great disagreement regarding the" correct" answers to each of
these questions and, because of the significant practical and
policy stakes of different answers, also tremendous contro- .
versy.
Finally, there are a host of redressability issues that are no
less controversial in nature. These relate to the circumstances
under which a disparate impact may be "justified" and, therefore, not proscribed by Title VI regulations. They also concern
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the circumstances under which, if any, a permitting agency
may require mitigation of the disparate impact by providing
offsetting benefits. A justification defense, for example, could
be as relaxed as economic profitability" or as demanding as
"public health emergency." A mitigation policy could be so
flexible as to allow for the "trading off" of human health risks
in favor of employment opportunities and other economic
benefits; or it could strictly provide that the only legitimate
mitigation are measures that address the very impact that is the
source of th~ disparity and, in effect, eliminate the disparity.
Each of these redressability issues implicates health/ economic
cost and benefit tradeoffs that have long eluded consensus in
environmental law and that have persisted instead in generating substantial controversy.
EPA has recently been struggling to offer at least some
tentative answers to some of these issues, first, in issuing
interim guidance,72 and more recently, in issuing revised
interim guidance. 73 The Agency has, not surprisingly, received
few accolades for its efforts. Nor is that likely to change in the
near future. The ingredients for consensus are too absent in this
setting. Most simply put, the policy implications of competing
choices are simply too disparate and the law too unformed to
allow for either easy compromise or clear answers.
The regulated community and many of the state agencies
that would be directly subject to EPA's Title VI scrutiny also
harbor a natural antipathy to the entire undertaking. The former has long complained about the rigors of environmental
protection requirements. The latter instinctively rebels against
further federal intrusions on state regulatory authority. For
each, the specter of an additional layer of environmental requirements, based not on either human health, economic efficiency, or technological feasibility, but on EPA's ephemeral
notions of equity is untenable. The equity touchstone is too uncertain in its meaning and application because of its enormous
variability. What equity would additionally require could depend on the actions of other sources, other communities, and
other permitting authorities. Neither the state regulators nor
their respective regulated communities relish a legal regime so
1/

72
See u.s. EPA, Interim Guidance on Investigating Title VI Administrative
Complaints Challenging Permits (February 1998); June M. Lyle, Reactions to EPA's
Interim Guidance: The Growing Battle for Control over Environmental lustice Decisiolllnaking, 75 IND. L.J. 687 (2000).
13
See sf/pra note 62.
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uncertain in its scope and application.
Finally, there is a case currently pending before the United
States Supreme Court (likely to be decided about the same time
this article goes to press) that will likely affect the future significance of Title VI in the environmental protection context. In
Alexander v. Sandoval/4 the Court is currently considering
whether private parties may initiate private rights of action to
enforce a federal agency's Title VI disparate impact regulations.
There is strong precedent in the Court's decisions that such an
implied private right of action to enforce Title VI exists75 and it
would seem at least somewhat counterintuitive to suppose that
a private right of action may exist to enforce a statutory proscription but not to enforce valid agency regulations promulgated pursuant to that same proscription.
There is nonetheless reason to anticipate that the Court
may rule against the existence of an implied private of action to
enforce a federal agency's disparate impact ban under Title VI.
The primary basis for such speculation is that the current Court
is likely to be skeptical of the legitimacy of the disparate impact
ban itself,76 It was a sharply splintered- Court that created the
judicial precedent in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission
of the City of New York,77 that courts have since read as upholding the authority of federal agencies to promulgate regulations
under Title VI that, extending beyond the statutory prohibition
on intentional discrimination, forbid federally-funded activities
and programs with a disparate impact. 78
Short of revisiting the continuing validity of that aspect of
Guardians, which does not seem to be a question fairly presented to the Court in Alexander, the Court might instead
choose to split the difference by disallowing a private right of
action for its enforcement. Indeed, that outcome might seem
particularly attractive to the Court. It would be in keeping with
the Court's recent rulings on implied private rights of action,
which have been less expansive towards their creation than

u.s. 5. ct. No. 99-1908 (argued January 16, 2001).
See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.s. 385 (1986); see also Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
76
See Thomas A. Lambert, Tile Case Against Disparate Impact SlIits, 34 GA. 1. REV.
1155 (2000).
77
463 U.S. 582 (1983).
78
See Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Calise of Action Under EPA's Title VI
Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental/llstiee Plailltijjs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
1. 1, 12-20 (1999); see e.g., David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1988); Sandoval v.
Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 5. Ct. 128 (2000).
7<

75
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earlier caselaw that supports its existence under Title VI in
generaI,79 In addition, because Alexander involves a suit against
a State, such a disposition would be gener<;tlly consistent with
the Court's recent reluctance to suppose congressional intent or
authority to allow private lawsuits against sovereign States. so
Were the Supreme Court in Alexander to limit the ability of
private parties to enforce Title VI regulations in court, the effectiveness of any restrictions on disparate impact imposed by
such regulations would be sharply limited, but not eliminated.
Plaintiffs would lose the current leverage they possess to
threaten recipients of federal funds, and those seeking permits
from such recipients, with Title VI lawsuits based on disparate
impact. That leverage has, even in the absence of any formal
successful adjudication on the merits, been sufficient to generate a series of creative settlements advantageous to environmental justice communities. S1
Enforcement of the disparate impact prohibition would instead be exclusively controlled by the federal agencies themselves, through administrative proceedings. Given the difficulty those agencies, including EPA, have had in deciding what
the disparate impact requirement even means, one might fairly
anticipate that administrative enforcement is likely to be less
than extensive. Because, moreover, courts are traditionally reluctant to second guess agency decisions involving the exercise
of their enforcement authority,82 there is likely to be little, if
any, meaningful judicial review of such agency determinations.
For all these reasons, Title VI may ultimately prove to be a
far less effective basis for legal redress on behalf of environmental justice communities than many anticipated just a few
years ago. While its epitaph need not be written, environmental
justice communities would be prudent to continue to explore
more fully other possible, untapped legal bases for redress, including the environmental protection laws themselves. S3
See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
See, e.g., Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765
(2000); Bd. of Tru. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct 955 (2001).
81
See Lazarus, supra note 23, at 272.
82
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
83
Professor Gerald Torres has even suggested that too closely tying environmental justice to racism and to a civil rights law framework may be "the wrong road
to follow if real changes for the communities at risk are to be achieved." Torres, supra
note 10, at 602. His suggestion is especially portentous because Professor Torres was
one of the primary authors of the President's Executive Order on Environmental Justice. See gellerally Gerald Torres, Changing the Way Govemment Views Environmental
Justice, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 543 (1994) (discussing the structure and pur79

80
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III. BI-WAYS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

The future of environmental justice is more likely to lie at
least as much outside civil rights law as within. It is also likely
to be found in the fair and effective enforcement of existing
laws rather than in their significant substantive amendment. As
much as civil rights laws provide an essential pathway for environmental justice, especially because of the symbolic significance of their mere invocation, the existing environmental protection statutes provide an additional avenue for environmental justice advocates.
Like civil rights laws, the environmental statutes constitute
one of the great successes of the second half of the twentieth
century in the United States. Emissions of significant air pollutants, such as particulate matter and lead, dropped more than
eighty and ninety-eight percent respectively, while the population, gross domestic product, and vehicular use increased by
more than twenty-seven, ninety, and 111 percent. Emissions of
carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and sulfur similarly decreased significantly. With the exception of southern
California, the pollution standard index in major U.S. urban
areas improved by seventy-two percent from 1985-1994; many
of the nation's waters are far cleaner than before; and hundreds
of abandoned and inactive hazardous waste sites have been
cleaned up.84
There are, to be sure, significant examples of lapses as well,
either because of statutory exemptions, regulatory exclusions,
limited administrative agency resources, or lack of political
wil1. 85 The plight of environmental justice communities are,
moreover, an example of such a lapse. In many instances, however, the source of the problem in existing environmental laws
for these communities is not traceable to either a statutory exemption or regulatory exclusion. The statutes as written provide many legal bases for effectively addressing the problems
of these communities. The problems have instead mostly resulted from the lack of creative and effective implementation
and enforcement of existing law on behalf of the legitimate environmental protection concerns of many communities. 86
poses of President Clinton's Executive Order on environmental justice).
84
ANDREWS, supra note 24, at 280-81.
85
See, e.g., J.B. Rubl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and EnvironmerJtal Law, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000).
86
I have more fully explored elsewhere the extent to which provisions in exist-
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This brings us back to the second highway described at the
outset of this essay: the highways surrounding the City of Atlanta in neighboring Georgia. The image of Atlanta's highways
is no doubt less visually striking than the proposed landfill adjacent to U.S. 80. It is, however, no less striking in its relevance
to environmental justice. The Atlanta highway system also effectively illustrates environmental law's existing, largely untapped potential.
Atlanta's highway system has the highest vehicular miles
travelled (VMTs) of any place in the world for a reason. The
metropolitan area is marked by a low density development pattern dependent on an extensive system of highways. Although
these highways are typically dubbed "freeways," they are free
only in the sense that there is no direct user charge applied to
those who decide to drive on them. They are certainly not free
to the extent they costs hundreds of millions of tax dollars to
construct and maintain. And, they are certainly not free in
terms of the environmental harm that they proximately cause.87
The City of Atlanta suffers from at least a "serious" ozone
pollution problem. 88 The area exceeds national ambient air
quality standards designed to safeguard public health. 89 The
metropolitan area's failure to meet the health standard for
ozone threatens everyone, but especially those who live in the
urban core, and who are disproportionately poor and the most
susceptible to the pollutant's adverse impacts.
There are, of course, substantial benefits to such an extensive system of freeways. Among the direct beneficiaries are
those wealthy enough to live in the suburbs surrounding Atlanta, who commute by automobile into the city. The highway
system, in effect, subsidizes those who chose to live further
away, both making it possible for them to do so and enhancing
their residential property values. Seemingly not comparably
subsidized, however, have been the mass transit options of
those living in the poorer, often racial minority, neighborhoods

ing federal environmental laws may authorize EPA to consider more fully environmental justice concerns in their implementation of those laws. See Richard J. Lazarus
& Stephanie Tai, Illtegratillg Ellvirollmelltal JI/stice illto EPA Permittillg Authority, 26
ECOLOGY L Q. 617 (1999).
87
See Jill Jordan Seider, Traffic Jam: III Atlallta, A Pitched Battle Over Roads Pollutioll, alld Boulldless Urball Sprawl, u.s. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 8, 1999, at 28 available.
88
40 C.F.R § 81.311 (2001).
89
Id.; see Barney Tumey, Ellvirollmelltal, Civil Rights Groups File Suit to Halt Highway COllstmctioll ill Atlallta Area, 32 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 341 (February 23,2001).
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of Atlanta. 9o
Because Atlanta's highway system plainly involves federal
funding, the possibility that federal transportation funds are
being spent by the state in a manner that disproportionately
disfavors minority residents necessarily raises a potential Title
VI issue. Local community members have, in fact, already filed
such a claim.91 It is nonetheless environmental law, not civil
rights law, that has the potential for more sweeping and effective legal redress.
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, as amended in 1990, federal
transportation funds cannot be spent in a manner not in "con_
formity" with federal environmental statutory air quality requirements.92 To satisfy that standard, Georgia must prepare a
"state implementation plan" (SIP) that satisfies the Air Act's
strict requirements for geographic area, like the Atlanta metropolitan area in "nonattainment" for ozone. 93 It also means that
the State must prepare a regional transportation plan that, also
subject to federal approval, will not contribute to VMTs in a
manner inconsistent with the Clean Air Act. 94 Because Georgia's SIP will pass muster under the Clean Air Act only if it is
capable of significantly reducing VMTs or at least their growth,
a regional transportation plan must likewise call for federal
transportation monies to be spent in a manner that contributes
to that reduction.
The Clean Air Act, in short, should require the State of
Georgia to spend less federal money on expanding and maintaining a system of highways that increases VMTs and more
federal money on promoting transportation options, such as
mass transit, that can reduce VMTs over the long term. The reallocation of federal funds will simultaneously be potentially
progressive in its distributional effect. The transportation options more important to the poorer communities in Atlanta will
receive a larger share of the federal subsidies.
Federal and State governmental officials, environmental
organizations, and environmental justice community groups
were very close to a major settlement of the related legal issues
90
See generally ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., SPRAWL CITY: RACE, POLITICS, AND
PLANNING IN ATLANTA (Island Press 2000).
91
See Robert D. Bullard, Race, Equity and Smart Growth, 3 TRANSP. EQUITY No.1
(Environmental Research Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University)( Fall/Winter
. 2000).
92
42 U.S.C. § 7506(c) (1994).
91
See id. § 7410(a)(2)(I), 7S11a(c).
94
See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 167 F.3d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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this past December that would have accomplished just such a
redistribution of federal transportation funding. 95 It would
have been a landmark settlement for environmental justice.
Unfortunately, the settlement negotiations broke down in the
final hours.96
Whatever the cause of the settlement's collapse, a coalition
of national environmental organizations, regional environmental organizations, and local environmental justice community representatives have now filed a series of lawsuits against
EPA, the federal Department of Transportation, and the State
of Georgia. 97 They are challenging the Department of Transportation's approval of the State's regional transportation plan, on
the ground that it lacks the required conformity with the federal Clean Air Act. They are seeking a judicial order that EPA
reclassify under that Act the Atlanta Air Quality District from
"serious" to "severe" for nonattainment with ozone. And, they
are asking the federal district court to compel EPA to disapprove Georgia's SIP on the ground that it will not achieve the
"reasonable further progress" towards attainment of ozone
standards mandated by the federallaw. 98
CONCLUSION

Environmental law has come a long way since the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King marched along U.S. Route 80 from
Selma to Montgomery over thirty-Six years ago. Much has happened since his assassination thirty-three years ago in Memphis. Back then, there was no EPA. No Clean Air Act. No Clean
Water Act. No Superfund law. No Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. And no Endangered Species Act. Nor were there
the state analogues that today exist in every state.
Today, the vast legal infrastructure of environmental law is
firmly in place, and well settled. The challenge is not so much
the need for new laws. It is instead for effective and fair implementation and enforcement of existing laws.
95
Kelly Simmons, Environmental Grollps Conditionally Accept State Plan on Roads,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 12, 2000, at D3.
96
Kelly Simmons, Agreement on Roads Broke Down in Details, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Jan. 4, 2001, at 3B; Barney Tumey, Atlanta Transportation Plan Settlement Falls
Apart; Environmental Grollps to SlIe, 32 ENVIR. REP.(BNA) 16 Oanuary 5, 2001).
91
See Kelly Simmons, Environmental Groups Sue Over Road Building, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Feb. 14,2001, at 3C; Barney Tumey, Environmental. Civil Rights Groups File
Suit to Halt Highway COllstructioll in Atlanta Area, 32 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 341 (February
23,2001).
98
See 42 V.S.c. § 7502(c)(2) (1994).
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It sounds deceptively easy. But it is not. It will not be easy
to change the transportation habits of a major metropolitan
area like Atlanta. But it was not easy in 1965 to march across a
bridge in Selma.
What was required then and now are risktakers: Public
citizens with a passion. This includes law students and lawyers
who are not complacent, but agitated. They are willing to master the complexity of environmental law. They are willing to
overcome the high institutional hurdles impeding its effective
enforcement. And they are willing to serve those communities
who have too long suffered from environmental injustice.
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